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VALIDITY OF A PERSONAL JUDGMENT FOLLOWING
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION UPON A DEFENDANT
WHO CANNOT BE FOUND WITHIN THE STATE
In the recent case of Cradduck v. Financial Indemnity Company,' the Dis-
trict Court of Appeals of California upheld a personal judgment obtained
against an individual defendant where service of process was made by
publication, the defendant having concealed himself within the state to
avoid service. While the case is not altogether one of first impression in
California,2 it is significant because it suggests that personal jurisdiction
may be obtained by means of publication when it is merely shown that the
defendant cannot be found within the state.
The plaintiff in this case filed an action in Superior Court against one
Cervantes to recover damages for personal injuries incurred in an automo-
bile accident caused by the negligence of Cervantes. Cervantes was a resi-
dent of California at the time of the accident' but could not be located for
personal service. Plaintiff obtained an order for publication of summons
and, subsequently, a default judgment against Cervantes, who was insured
by Financial Indemnity Company. Plaintiff then sued Financial Indem-
nity on the judgment and recovered, and the insurance carrier appealed
on the ground that the judgment against Cervantes was void for lack of
proper service. Defendant contended that when the whereabouts of a tort-
feasor is not known a valid judgment cannot be granted against him based
upon service of summons by publication.
In upholding the judgment against a collateral attack by the defend-
ant's insurance carrier, although deciding the case on the basis of conceal-
ment, the Court indicated that publication may be a valid method of serv-
ice where the defendant merely cannot be located for personal service.
While this statement was made by way of dicta and was not necessary to
the decision reached, it is the first indication by a California court that it
may be possible to dispense with the necessity of personal service in a case
in which the plaintiff can show that the defendant cannot be located within
the state after a diligent search. This comment will examine the Cradduck
decision in relation to both the California statutory requirements for serv-
ice of process and the constitutional requirement of due process.
1242 Adv.Cal.App. 991, 52 Cal.Rptr. 90 (1966). A hearing by the California Supreme
Court has been denied. Aug. 24, 1966.
2 The facts in Miller v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.App.2d 779, 46 Cal.Rptr. 36 (1961), cited
in Cradduck, were quite similar. Miller was a direct attack upon a personal judgment where
service by publication was the only service of process. In Miller, the order for publication of
summons contained a finding that the defendant was concealing himself to avoid service. Al-
though in Cradduck the order for publication contained a finding that defendant could not be
found after diligent search, the Court held that an inference of concealment could be drawn
from the facts in the affidavit.
3 The affidavit failed to state that Cervantes was a resident but the Court held there were
sufficient facts in the affidavit from which an inference of residence could be drawn and that
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
I
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
A State may have potential jurisdiction in a civil proceeding when the
property or individuals involved in the proceeding are within the borders
of the State. Before a State can legitimately exercise its potential power,
however, its jurisdiction must be perfected by the appropriate service of
process.4 The usual mode of service in California is personal service, as set
forth in Section 410 and 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However,
where personal service is impossible Section 412 allows service by publi-
cation under an order of the Court. The plaintiff must show in an affidavit
that personal service is impossible because (1) the defendant resides out
of state, or (2) has departed from the state, or (3) cannot with due dili-
gence be found within the state or (4) has concealed himself to avoid
service.
A problem arises in that the language of Section 412, which allows pub-
lication as a means of service, gives no indication that the statute applies
to actions in personam. Notice from service by publication has long been
held valid in actions in rem in California and such service has been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court.5 For example, the State may provide
any reasonable means of imparting notice in an action to determine title to
real estate;' in probate; 7 and in garnishment or attachment proceedings.8
Of course, any judgment rendered in such proceedings can have no conse-
quence beyond the property involved.' Actions affecting status have also
been held valid if only the status of the person is affected and there is no
personal judgment given.' °
"As against collateral attack it is enough that required facts appear by inference." 242 Adv.
Cal.App. 991, 997, 52 Cal.Rptr. 90, 94 (1966). Had Cervantes not been a resident of California,
it might be noted that service could have been made pursuant to CAL. VEH. CODE §17451. Un-
der this statute, a non-resident motorist, by his use of the state highways, gives constructive
consent to jurisdiction of a lawsuit arising from such use and to service of process through
the Director of Motor Vehicles. The service may be made upon the non-resident in another state
by registered mail. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld this form of substituted service in the
leading case of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115, 122
(1915) ; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392, 394 (1914).
5 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 4; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
see 1, Wrrxni, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE §§93-106 (1934).
6 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890).
7 Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
8 Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ; Dewey v. DesMoines, 173 U.S. 193, 203 (1899).
10 Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 89.Cal.App.2d 877, 202 P.2d 369 (1949) (action for
annulment) ; Hartford v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal.2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956) (judgment establish-
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While Section 412 is silent as to any distinction between actions in
rem and in personam, Section 417 deals expressly with the problem of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state individual (non-cor-
porate) defendant. In such cases, service by publication alone is not suf-
ficient; rather, out-of-state personal service is required. Further, having
met this requirement, the Court will have personal jurisdiction, under Sec-
tion 417,.in only three situations: where the defendant was a resident of
California (1) at the time of the commencement of the action, or (2) at
the time that the cause of action arose, or (3) at the time of service. Al-
though the court can exercise its power only by personal service on the
defendant, this service can be made outside the state."
Section 417 furnishes a possible guideline as to whether a court has
power to render a personal judgment under Section 412 publication pro-
visions upon a resident who is within the state. Because Section 417 ap-
plies to two of the circumstances in which Section 412 also applies, i.e.,
when the defendant has departed from or resides outside the state, an
inference can be drawn that Section 417 restricts a power granted in Sec-
tion 412-the power to obtain a valid personal judgment by publication. 2
If this inference is drawn, as it was in the Cradduck case,' 3 it would seem
that Section 412 is literally broad enough to establish personal jurisdiction
by publication in all cases other than those expressly covered by Section
417. Thus when the defendant is within the state but cannot be personally
served due to either his intentional concealment or plaintiff's mere inabil-
ity to locate him after a diligent search, personal jurisdiction may be ob-
tained by publication.
Of course, in order to find service by publication sufficient for a per-
sonal judgment, a court has to find that Section 417 is not applicable. If
it is shown that the defendant has actually left the state, Section 417 ap-
ing paternity not binding although a judgment freeing a domiciliary from the relationship of
father and child with a nondomiciliary would be binding); see 1 WITXIN, CALIFORNIA PRODE-
DURE §§107-114 (1954).
11 Relying on Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), it was long felt that such personal
service could only be accomplished by serving the defendant within the state. However, in
1940, the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, limited the rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff as to residents, holding that a personal judgment was valid when service was made in
compliance with a Wyoming statute authorizing personal service outside the state upon Wyo-
ming residents who had left the state to avoid service.
12 "Based on the broad authority of sections 412 and 413, section 417 is manifestly de-
signed to restrict the power of the court if a personal judgment is to be entered." Allen v.
Superior Court, 41 Cal.2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953) ; see also Owens v. Superior Court, 52
Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
13 242 Adv.Cal.App. 991, 998, 999, 52 Cal.Rptr. 90, 95 (1966).
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plies and personal judgment can only be obtained after out-of-state per-
sonal service. In Cradduck, the court held that the conclusion in the affida-
vit that defendant had left the state was unwarranted by the facts
presented therein. The court then concluded that Section 417 had no ap-
plication where it is not known whether the defendant was within or with-
out the state. "Obviously the section [417 ] presupposes a defendant whose
whereabouts outside the State of California are known-one who can be
reached in another state for personal service of summons." 1
II
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A valid personal judgment must meet not only statutory requirements but
also the constitutional requirement of due process by means of fair notice
to the defendant. It is this constitutional requirement that has been the
fundamenal basis for the contention that service by publication will not
support a personal judgment. 5
The United States Supreme Court has set forth constitutional limita-
tions that must be met if a valid personal judgment is to be obtained. The
requirements of due process must be met by giving "fair notice" to the
defendant.16 "Fair notice" carries implications of likelihood of actual
notice, 7 reasonableness and justice to the defendant.
[A]dequacy . . .so far as due process is concerned is dependant on
whether or not the form of substituted service ... is reasonably calcu-lated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to
be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice implicit in due process are satisfied. 18
The court in Cradduck held that when by his own actions the defendant
has made the only reasonable method of reaching himself that of publi-
cation, it is fair that he should be bound by that method, though it gives
him a lesser likelihood of actual notice than do other methods.
The United States Supreme Court has not passed upon the validity of
substituted service in the Cradduck situation. The Supreme Court has
indicated by dicta that a substituted service by leaving a summons at the
14 Id. at 995. 52 Cal.Rptr. 90, 92.
15 Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Natural Persons, 44 CAL. L. REV. 737
(1956); Comment, Service of Process in Civil Actions in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 80
(1949); 1 WTKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE §301 (1954).16 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
17 Mere cognizance of the existence of the action is not notice in the legal sense, upon
which a valid judgment can be rendered. Peabody v. Phelps, 9 Cal. 213 (1858).
18 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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last abode would be sufficient.' 9 This method will usually provide more
likelihood that the defendant will actually see the summons than does pub-
lication. However, in the same case it was said, "To dispense with personal
service, the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the
least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done.2" [Em-
phasis added.] Publication, then, is not reasonable if a better method is
available."
It can be contended in an effort to meet the "likelihood test" that pub-
lication is the method of notice most likely to reach a defendant who has
concealed himself or cannot be found after deligient search. Slight as this
likelihood may be, publication is the only possible method. The Court in
Cradduck takes such a position: "It is obvious that no notice other than
that which was given could have been given. Every possible means of
reaching him was exhausted. Any further requirement of notice would
seem unreasonable." 2 The thrust of the court's decision that the constitu-
tional requirement of "fair notice" is met is based on the concepts of jus-
tice and fair play to the defendant.
There is precedent in California that the constitutional requirement is
met in the situation of persons who conceal themselves to avoid service. 3
Miller v. Superior Court24 cites Ware v. Robinson,25 as does Cradduck to
this effect:
A person who deliberately conceals himself to evade service of process
is scarcely in a position to complain overmuch of unfairness in substitu-
tive methods of notification enacted by the legislature to cope with such
situations. When it satisfactorily appears that a defendant by his own
design successfully has secreted himself from the process server and
thus thwarted personal service, it would indeed be anomalous to heed
an assertion that he had been denied notice and an opportunity to be
heard .26
Cradduck goes on to cite Miller with approval:
We do not feel constrained, however, to hold that personal service of
process upon the petitioner is a mandatory requirement for the entry of
a personal judgment. There was no finding of the court supported by
substantial evidence that petitioner had either departed from the state
or was absent therefrom .... We therefore find no imbalance of fair
play in allowing the plaintiffs to proceed upon constructive service of
19McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
20 1d. at 92.
21 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), holding publication invalid in
action in rem where service by mail is practicable.
22242 Adv.Cal.App. 991, 1001, 52 Cal.Rptr. 90, 97 (1966).
23 Narum v. Cheatham, 127 Cal.App.2d 505, 15 P.2d 1106 (1932); Butler v. McKey, 138
F.2d 373 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 780 (1944).
24 195 Cal.App.2d 779, 46 Cal.Rptr. 36 (1961), supra note 2.
259 Cal. 108, 112 (1858).
26 Miller v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.App.2d 779, 786, 46 Cal.Rptr. 36, 43 (1961).
April 1967] COMMENTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
process against the petitioner who is concealing himself to evade serv-
ice. The contention that he may have fled the jurisdiction and therefore
must be personally notified of the action is based upon conjecture and
not evidence. Otherwise, so long as petitioner was successful in evading
the process server, plaintiff's right to proceed with their lawsuit would
be stalemated and their claims held in abeyance.2 7
Thus it would seem that California permits publication when the defend-
ant is actually concealing himself to avoid service. This seems to be based
primarily on defendant's moral position.2 8 The Court in Cradduck need
not have gone further than Miller in determining the validity of publica-
tion since it had inferred from the facts that Cervantes was concealing
himself. Yet, the Court undertook to extend the reasoning to a person who
merely could not after diligent search be found:
We have assumed arguendo but we do not hold that proof by affidavit
that Cervantes' concealment to avoid some29 process was necessary to
justify a personal judgment. It is true that a defendant who is secreting
himself is in a morally inferior position to one who cannot be found
after due diligence. It does not follow that only the former is vulnerable
to a personal judgment after published summons. Due process requires
no more than "fair notice." 30
The Court's language suggests that it may be fair to hold the defend-
ant who merely cannot be found subject to personal jurisdiction by pub-
lication. This is justified, for to allow service by publication where the
defendant is concealing himself and deny it where the defendant merely
cannot be found would lead to fruitless speculation as to why the defend-
ant cannot be found.
There is an additional consideration which justifies finding jurisdiction
in the situation where the defendant merely cannot be found. An argument
cen be made that such a defendant is in the same position as the defendant
who conceals himself in that he has violated a responsibility-that of
amenability to service-by making himself unavailable for service, whether
deliberately or not. This was a factor mentioned by the Supreme Court
in Milliken v. Meyer:
27 Id. at 788. 46 Cal.Rptr. at 45.
28 The U.S. Supreme Court has not held on this position although it did give cognizance to
the moral position of the defendant in Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195 (1860), where it held
that service by publication was sufficient to support a judgment by the appellate court when
personal service had been made at the lower court action. Defendant has no ". . . right to
complain that notice was served by publication, pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction from
which he has voluntarily withdrawn." Nations v. Johnson, supra, at 204.
29 It is not necessary that the defendant be avoiding service in the action in question.' In
Miller, the defendant had hidden himself to avoid arrest under a criminal charge for drunk
driving. In Cradduck, Cervantes had hidden to evade arrest for failure to provide child sup-
port.
30 242 Adv.Cal.App. at 1001, 52 Cal.Rptr. at 96.
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The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to him
and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal
duties.... One such incidence of domicile is amenability to suit within
the state even during sojourns without the state, where the state has
provided and employed a reasonable method for apprising such an ab-
sent party of the proceedings against him.3 1
If a person has a duty of amenability to service, it would seem that he
fails to fulfill it when he conceals himself to avoid service or when he inad-
vertently fails to provide means whereby others through diligent efforts
can locate him.
III
CONCLUSION
In fairness to an injured party, it would be a desirable social end to solve
the dilemma of the plaintiff who cannot obtain a personal judgment merely
because the defendant cannot be found. The Court in Cradduck suggested
that such a goal could be achieved through service by publication without
violating the defendant's statutory or constitutional rights. The defendant
has a right to be served with notice and the Court did not suggest that this
right may be waived. It did suggest however, that certain methods of serv-
ice may be waived if the defendant himself has made these impossible to
execute. Due to this impossibility, justice may be frustrated regardless of
defendant's reason for being unavailable. A differentiation based on actual
concealment as opposed to mere inability to be found after diligent search
introduces difficult problems of proof and is not required by the underly-
ing policies involved. Service by publication should not be regarded as
punitive, but as a legitimate means of service when no other method is
practical. Carol S. Johnson
31 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-464 (1940).
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